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Stakeholders’ Influence on French Unions’ CSR Strategies 
 
Abstract 
Labor unions are key stakeholders in the field of corporate social responsibility but researchers have 
paid surprisingly little attention to their CSR strategies. This article extends stakeholder theory by 
treating unions as having stakeholders that influence their CSR strategies. Drawing on qualitative 
data from a longitudinal study on selected unions in France between 2006 and 2013, this paper 
analyzes the underlying reasons for the differences in their approaches. It finds connections between 
the unions’ CSR strategy, and the perception of and cooperation with stakeholders. 
Keywords 
Corporate social responsibility, unions, France, stakeholders, government, NGOs. 
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Introduction 1 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), i.e. the integration of social and environmental challenges in 
companies’ strategies and management practices, has become a major issue in management 
research and public debate. To respond to current or future expectations of stakeholders, companies 
must invent and implement more responsible strategies, business models, management practices 
and rules of governance. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the impact of CSR strategies 
on trade unions (Preuss et al., 2006), and to unions’ strategies in this field. Unions are major 
stakeholders because they both directly affect and are affected by the changes in companies’ 
strategies and management practices. They evidently play a role as external stakeholders and may 
thus exert pressure on individual companies or influence the broader political debate and even 
legislation. Moreover, in continental Europe, unions are involved in the decision-making process 
via mandatory information and consultation procedures related to social and economic aspects 
(Hall, 2005), and via co-determination procedures in countries such as Germany (Weiss, 2004). 
Depending on their perceptions of CSR and their strategies, unions may thus be either a driver for 
or an obstacle to the development of CSR, be it at the national, at the sectoral or at the company 
level, and consequently offer an interesting field of research. 
 
Although the development of international standards and the activities of international players has 
homogenized debates and practices in CSR, national differences remain very strong in this area 
(Matten & Moon, 2008; Berthoin Antal & Sobczak, 2007, 2013). The legal, cultural, economic and 
social aspects of contexts shape the way the relations between business and society are perceived 
and the way companies’ responsibilities are defined. It is therefore fruitful to look at the question of 
how unions formulate their CSR policy in their national context. This contribution focuses on the 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Prof. Dr. Ariane Berthoin Antal, senior research fellow at the Berlin Social Science 
Center (WZB) for valuable comments on previous versions of the article. 
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example of France and draws on data generated in a longitudinal qualitative study of selected 
unions. It extends our presentation of the variation in French unions’ perceptions of CSR and 
related strategies (Sobczak & Havard, 2013) by analyzing the underlying reasons for the differences 
in these unions’ CSR approaches. 
 
In France, much more than in other countries, the role of central government, and to a lesser extent 
of regional governments, has been crucial to the development of CSR practices within companies, 
and has drawn civil society into this debate (Berthoin Antal & Sobczak, 2007). Over three decades 
ago it was the first country to mandate the preparation of corporate social reports with an extensive 
list of indicators, and it also required management to discuss the report with the works’ council and 
to document their response (Rey 1980). In 2001, France adopted legislation on mandatory CSR 
reporting for companies listed on the stock market (Delbard, 2008) thus creating a strong incentive 
for the largest companies to develop responsible business practices that they can highlight in their 
annual publications. Ten years later (2011), this legislation was extended to all companies with 
more than 5,000 employees, and from 2013 on it also covers those with more than 500 employees. 
Moreover, the government has launched various stakeholder consultation processes in sustainable 
development and CSR to reach consensus about the social and environmental challenges within the 
country and to define common strategies to face these challenges (Stanziola, 2008; Whiteside et al., 
2010). These processes have pushed the various societal actors to invest in acquiring knowledge in 
these areas and to formulate clear policy statements in order to be able to influence national 
legislation or strategies. 
 
In a similar vein, regional governments in France have developed several initiatives to encourage 
and support companies in the definition and implementation of responsible business practices. 
Some regional governments integrate social and environmental criteria into their public purchasing 
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policies, creating an advantage for companies that develop responsible business practices (Streurer 
et al., 2007). Certain regional governments have also created regional platforms for stakeholder 
dialogues that are particularly useful for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have 
difficulty bringing together external stakeholders (Sobczak & Cam, 2012). 
 
This specific context has inevitably influenced the CSR strategies and activities of French unions. 
Indeed, through mandatory CSR reporting French unions have gained access to considerable social 
and environmental information allowing them to identify both responsible and less responsible 
practices within companies. Further, the quality of social dialogue is one of the criteria companies 
must report on, which may favor the negotiation of agreements on CSR. Finally, unions, like other 
stakeholders, are frequently invited by national and regional governments to take part in 
consultations on CSR. While unions are free to develop critical approaches toward the CSR concept 
during these consultations, it is difficult for them to refuse to attend these consultations given the 
strong role of governments in France. 
 
In France, several unions co-exist and increasingly compete for members and for recognition by 
public authorities. Since the 1960s, five French unions have been considered as representative at the 
national level, which means that they are allowed to take part in collective bargaining and national 
consultation processes: CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail), CFDT (Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail), CGT-FO (Force Ouvrière), CFTC (Confédération Française des 
Travailleurs Chrétiens) and CFE-CGC (Confédération Générale des Cadres). Other unions represent 
the industry or company level. In 2008, the French legislature introduced important changes to 
union representativeness rules: representativeness is now based on the results of workplace 
elections. Although the five unions have maintained their representativeness at the national level 
(Andolfatto & Labbé, 2012), this new rule has created pressure on the smallest unions and has 
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fueled competition among the unions, particularly regarding CSR. While some unions consider 
CSR as an opportunity to change companies’ behavior and play a more important role in their 
governance, others remain skeptical and see CSR as a marketing tool that companies use to avoid 
real change in their management practices. 
 
To analyze the reasons underlying the strategies and activities French unions develop in the area of 
CSR, this article draws on and extends stakeholder theory. While this theory is usually used to 
understand companies’ strategies and practices, we apply it to other kinds of organizations to better 
grasp the interactions between organizations and other actors. This article therefore seeks to make 
two kinds of contributions to the field: (a) to shed light on the influence of stakeholders on French 
unions’ CSR strategies and activities, and (b) to illustrate the value of taking a less corporate-
centered view of stakeholder theory by showing its fruitful application to unions and industrial 
relations. 
 
The remainder of the article is organized in five sections. Firstly, we briefly describe French unions’ 
CSR strategies. Secondly, we explain how the use of stakeholder theory can contribute to a better 
understanding of unions’ strategies and activities in the field of CSR. In the third section, we detail 
our methodology based on three series of interviews with French union leaders on their perceptions 
of CSR and their activities in this area. In the fourth section, we present and discuss the results of 
our study related to stakeholders’ influence on unions’ CSR strategies. The conclusion summarizes 
the contributions and limitations of this article and outlines avenues of future research.  
 
French Unions’ CSR strategies 
 
An exploratory study showed that the strategies the five major French unions have developed in the 
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field of CSR differ quite significantly along several dimensions (Sobczak & Havard, 2014). Table 1 
presents how the five unions perceive CSR, the human resources they dedicate to CSR, and the 
CSR-related communication and training activities they pursue. 
 
Table 1: French unions’ perceptions and activities in CSR 
Unions  Perception of CSR CSR teams Communication on 
CSR 
Training 
activities related 
to CSR 
CFDT  CSR is the application of the 
sustainable development concept 
at the company level – integrated 
vision of CSR  
4 full-time 
employees  
Debates, internal 
circulars 
Training sessions 
and seminars since 
2005  
CFTC  The success of a company 
depends on its stakeholders – 
integrated vision of CSR  
2 part-time 
employees  
Debates, 
communication on 
CSR in the supply 
chain 
Training sessions  
CGT  Distinguishes CSR and 
sustainable development  - 
integrated vision of CSR  
4 part-time 
employees and 
a working 
group  
Website, debates, 
creation of a network  
Training sessions  
CFE-
CGC  
CSR corresponds to the social 
pillar within the sustainable 
development concept – 
competing vision of CSR  
1.5 full-time 
employees  
Wants to create a 
network, sustainable 
development guide  
Expected training 
sessions for 2013  
CGT-FO  Skeptical vision, CSR is only a 
communication strategy for 
firms, and weakens worker's 
interests  
1 employee  Internal circular  No training 
 
To describe the strategies these French unions develop in the field of CSR, we draw on the 
Reactive-Defensive-Accomodative-Proactive (RDAP) scale that Clarkson developed for companies, 
which distinguishes between reactive, defensive, accommodative and proactive strategies towards 
CSR (Clarkson, 1995:109). Unions, like companies, may have different perceptions of CSR, they 
must also define their position on the topic and communicate their strategy for addressing it. This is 
particularly true in the French context, where unions are frequently consulted by the government on 
possible legislation related to CSR and by companies on initiatives in the field of diversity 
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management, training or restructuring. Unions must therefore decide whether and to what extent to 
support or to challenge the principles of CSR and their implementation. Table 2 summarizes the 
CSR strategies of the five major French unions. Our research has revealed that although the 
strategies of the five French unions changed little during the period under study (Sobczak & 
Havard, 2006 and 2013), they have been expressed increasingly explicitly in union publications. For 
example, CGT-FO published an overview about the union’s position on CSR (Le Pen, 2011), and 
disseminated a circular on the subject (Pavageau, 2012); CGT (2011) produced a report on Human 
Sustainable Development; CFTC (2011) published a manifest on the social footprint; CFE-CGC 
(2011a) drafted a charter on sustainable development in 2011; and CFDT asked a consultant to 
analyze CSR reporting and disseminated the study largely (Chabrol O. and Cosette (2012). Only in 
one case, namely the CGT-FO, did the CSR strategy shift from a reactive one to a defensive one in 
2012-2013. Over the period, the four other unions tried to implement and their positions toward 
CSR.  
 
Table 2: French unions’ CSR strategies based on the RDAP-scale (Clarkson, 1995) 
Rating Posture or strategy Performance French unions 
Reactive Deny responsibility Doing less than required CGT-FO (2006-2011) 
Defensive Admit responsibility but fight it Doing the least that is 
required 
CGT-FO (2012-2013) 
Accommodative Accept responsibility Doing all that is required CFTC, CFE-CGC 
Proactive Anticipate responsibility Doing more than is required CFDT, CGT 
 
It is interesting to note that French unions’ CSR strategies do not reflect the traditional demarcation 
line opposing unions committed to collective bargaining (CFDT, CFTC, CFE-CGC) and those more 
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reluctant to sign collective agreements (CGT and CGT-FO) (Pernot, 2005). In particular, CGT, 
which was traditionally seen as radical and opposed to negotiations with employers (Le Queux & 
Sainsaulieu, 2010), has adopted a proactive CSR strategy. 
 
Analyzing Unions’ CSR Strategies from the Stakeholder Theory Perspective 
Stakeholder theory originated as an alternative theory of the firm, arguing that managers should be 
responsible not only towards shareholders but to all stakeholders, i.e. all individuals or groups that 
affect the companies’ activities and/or are affected by them (Freeman, 1984). Companies are 
understood as being part of a political-economic system of stakeholders that interact and influence 
management practices. Each stakeholder tries to optimize and protect its interests (Frooman, 1999; 
Savage et al., 1991). Management research based on stakeholder theory can clarify how different 
stakeholders influence companies’ decisions and strategies (Frooman, 1999; Frooman & Murrell, 
2005; Elms et al., 2010), and how companies can manage the relations with their stakeholders 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Savage et al. 1991; Rowley, 1997; Burchell & Cook, 2013). 
 
Research has underlined the merits of distinguishing different categories of stakeholders to allow 
managers to decide which stakeholders they should give priority to when defining their strategies 
and activities. The best known distinction opposes primary or contractual stakeholders (such as 
shareholders, employees, clients and suppliers), and secondary stakeholders (such as NGOs, public 
authorities, media and competitors) (Carroll, 1989; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Beyond this 
formal distinction, several authors suggest that managers should take the specific characteristics of 
each stakeholder group into account. Savage et al. (1991) contend that managers should assess each 
stakeholder’s potential to threaten and to cooperate with the company in order to determine the kind 
of relations the company may develop with it. Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that each stakeholder 
group’s power of influence be evaluated, along with its degree of legitimacy and the urgency of its 
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claim on the company. Girard and Sobczak (2012) add a new dimension by underlining that 
stakeholders’ influence on companies’ CSR strategies depends not only on the way the company 
perceives its stakeholders, but also on the stakeholders’ strategies and in particular on their 
commitment towards the company and towards the principles of CSR. Indeed, a stakeholder that is 
not committed to the company or to the CSR concept is less likely to influence the company’s CSR 
strategy, even if the company perceives it as powerful and legitimate. Table 3 summarizes the 
factors that may explain the impact of different stakeholder groups on companies’ CSR strategies. 
 
Table 3: Factors explaining stakeholders’ impact on companies’ CSR strategies 
Cooperation with stakeholders Stakeholder attributes  Stakeholder commitment  
- Stakeholders’ potential to 
cooperate with the company 
(Savage et al., 1991) 
- Contractual relationship with 
the company (Carroll, 1989) 
- Stakeholders’ commitment to 
the company (Girard & 
Sobczak, 2012) 
- Stakeholders’ power of 
influence (Mitchell et al.,1997) / 
potential threat to the company 
(Savage et al., 1991) 
- Degree of legitimacy/urgency of 
stakeholders’ claim (Mitchell et 
al., 1997) 
- Stakeholders’ commitment to 
CSR principles (Girard & 
Sobczak, 2013) 
 
Even if not all companies involve unions in their stakeholder dialogue on their CSR strategy, there 
is little doubt that unions are relevant stakeholders for companies (Dawkins, 2010), particularly in 
the French context, where they remain powerful despite a low rate of unionization (Wolff, 2008). It 
would be naïve and dangerous to consider that the integration of economic, social and 
environmental challenges could be handled by companies alone. The development and 
implementation of more responsible business models and management practices is a concern for all 
kinds of organizations, leading some to prefer the broader terms “social responsibility” or even 
“global responsibility” to the term “CSR” (Berthoin Antal & Sobczak, 2004). We therefore propose 
to consider unions as focal organizations that must develop CSR strategies and activities while 
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managing stakeholder relations. 
  
Several researchers have indeed shown that the principles of stakeholder theory developed for 
companies (O’Riordan & Fairbrass, 2008; Jamali, 2008) may be transposed to other kinds of 
organizations (Knox & Gruar, 2007; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Arenas et al., 2009). We build on 
this work and take what we call a multi-focal approach to stakeholder theory in order to do justice 
to the fact that unions’ strategies towards CSR are necessarily influenced by and influence other 
actors. The analysis of the relations each French union develops with other stakeholders and how 
they perceive the attributes of each stakeholder group may thus contribute to a better understanding 
of the different strategies and activities unions develop in the field of CSR. 
 
To analyze stakeholders’ impact on the CSR strategies of the five major unions in France, we first 
identify unions’ main stakeholders. According to the most common definition of stakeholders, 
unions’ stakeholders are all groups or individuals that can affect and/or are affected by the 
attainment of the unions’ objectives (Freeman, 1984). This includes union members, individual 
employers and their associations, public authorities, other unions, and, more specific to the CSR 
context, NGOs (figure 1). Consequently, unions’ stakeholders are mostly identical to those of 
companies. 
 
Figure 1: Unions’ main stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
Union 
Employees/members 
Non-governmental organizations 
Other unions 
Government 
Individual employers and employers’ associations 
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Given that only stakeholders committed to CSR may have a real impact on unions’ CSR strategies, 
we concentrate on this category. The second step thus consists of analyzing how each of the five 
unions perceives the stakeholder groups committed to CSR and what kind of cooperation it 
establishes with them. The aim is to create a link between these elements and the CSR strategy 
developed by the union. For example, unions with a proactive CSR strategy may perceive a higher 
potential to cooperate among stakeholders that are committed to CSR than unions that have a 
reactive or defensive strategy. In a similar vein, unions with a reactive approach to CSR may not 
perceive the legitimacy of stakeholders defending CSR-related claims. Figure 2 summarizes our 
theoretical framework. 
 
Figure 2: Impact of unions’ perception of and relations with stakeholders on their CSR strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology to Analyze Stakeholders’ Impact on Unions’ CSR Strategies 
Unions’ CSR strategy 
- Reactive 
- Defensive 
- Accommodative 
- Proactive 
Unions’ perception of stakeholders 
committed to CSR 
- Power to influence/potential threat 
- Legitimacy/urgency of the claim 
Cooperation between unions and 
stakeholders committed to CSR 
- Potential to cooperate 
- Contractual relationship 
- Stakeholders’ commitment to the 
union 
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To understand the impacts of stakeholders on unions’ CSR strategy, we used data obtained in our 
first exploratory study and reinterpreted specific data from a grounded perspective. Grounded 
theory is an appropriate method to explain interesting phenomena that are not yet framed by a 
specific theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Saunders and al., 2009). Consistent with Suddaby’s 
(2006) description of misconceptions on grounded theory, our aim is not to test stakeholder theory 
to analyze the impact of union’s stakeholders on their CSR strategy. Instead, we explore stakeholder 
theory in light of the data collected in our exploratory study. 
 
In 2006, we launched an exploratory study to understand French unions’ positions on CSR, which 
had not yet been analyzed. We used a qualitative method to collect and analyze data on this new 
phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2009). We interviewed eight representatives of the main French 
unions (CGT, CFDT and CGT-FO) at the national level and at the sectoral level (metallurgy, 
energy, and chemistry) (see Table 4). At the national level, the interviewees were in charge of CSR, 
sustainable development or economic affairs within their unions. The respondents at the sectoral 
level had been involved in the negotiation of transnational company agreements on CSR. The 
interviews were conducted face-to-face, and wide ranging open questions were used, covering 
themes such as perceptions of sustainable development and CSR, internal structures adopted to deal 
with CSR, activities developed to promote CSR among union members, unions’ involvement in the 
negotiation of collective agreements related to CSR, and relationships with other unions, NGOs and 
government in the field of CSR. Each interview was tape-recorded and transcribed. This first 
exploratory study helped us to identify the positions of the three main French unions toward CSR.  
 
In 2012 and 2013, we undertook a second research phase, with two more waves of data collection 
(again with a qualitative methodology, Creswell 2013) in order to understand the evolution, if any, 
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in unions’ positions toward CSR, and their relations with other stakeholders. We conducted 8 
interviews in 2012 and 6 in 2013, focusing both times on the national level by talking with 
representatives of the five major French unions considered as representative according to the last 
union elections and thus invited to take part in the consultation processes organized by the central 
government (see Tables 4). In this phase we included the smaller unions (CFTC and CFE-CGC) 
because after the “Environment Grenelle” organized by the French government in 2007, they, too, 
developed clear positions on CSR.  
 
Table 4: Overview of interviews with union representatives in 2006, 2012, and 2013  
 First exploratory data collecting Second period of data collecting 
2006 2012 2013 
National Sector National Sector National 
CGT 1 2 
(Energy & Metal industry) 
1 0 1 
CFDT 1 2 
(Chemicals & Energy) 
1 0 1 
CGT-FO 1 1 
(Energy) 
1 2 
(Energy) 
1 
CFTC 0 0 2 0 2 
CFE-CGC 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 8 8 6 
 
In 2012, all the union representatives that we had interviewed in 2006 had changed responsibilities, 
so our respondents were different from the first sample. But in 2013, the interviewees remained the 
same as 2012 in all cases except the CFE-CGC (due to internal reorganization). In 2012, all but one 
of the interviews were conducted face to face (one was a telephone interview), whereas the follow-
up interviews in 2013 all were conducted by phone. The interview protocol for 2012 concentrated 
on unions’ definitions of CSR, their positions concerning CSR and sustainable development, their 
organizational design in the field of CSR, as well as the actions developed to increase awareness of 
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CSR among members, the training of unionists or the negotiation of CSR-related agreements and 
the relations with different stakeholders. We also wanted to analyze the possible evolutions of the 
unions between 2006 and 2012. In 2013, our follow-up interviews aimed first at updating the 
information on the various actions the unions developed in the field of CSR (information, training, 
or collective bargaining) and the organization design. We then posed questions about the influence 
of external stakeholders and the importance of CSR in the unions’ strategy. Again, each interview 
was tape-recorded and transcribed. 
 
In addition to the interviews, we analyzed various CSR-related union publications and position 
papers, as well as general union publications and websites. We thus gained a broader view of their 
perceptions of CSR and activities in this field than we could through the interviews conducted with 
the union representatives in charge of CSR. 
 
Following the rules of qualitative data analysis (Cresswell, 2013), the transcribed interviews from 
both studies were read several times to form a comprehensive picture of data and to code and 
recode the data according to the various research steps. We used a template analysis, which 
combines “a deductive and an inductive approach to qualitative analysis in the sense that codes can 
be predetermined and then amended or added to as data are collected and analyzed” (Saunders and 
al., 2009: 505). First, every phase of the analysis was conducted individually by each author. 
Second, we discussed the ideas and interpretations that emerged. This kind of triangulation 
putatively increases the credibility of analysis (Patton, 2002). We use quotations from interviews in 
the main body of the text to make it easier for the reader to evaluate our interpretations. 
 
After each series of interviews, the results were published in French academic or management 
journals (Sobczak & Havard, 2009; 2013) and the publications were transmitted to the interviewed 
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unions. This created trust and eased our access to more detailed information with each wave of 
interviews. We subsequently solicited the interviewees’ reactions and tested the reliability of our 
research (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
Findings: Stakeholders’ Impact on Unions’ CSR Strategies 
 
Our study focused on the impact of four external stakeholder groups on the CSR strategies of the 
five major French unions, i.e. central government, NGOs, individual companies and other unions. 
In our interviews, the union representatives did not mention employers’ associations. Further, the 
impact of members on unions’ strategies was difficult to measure, even if unions portrayed their 
CSR strategies as resulting from their members’ decisions. Gathering this information would have 
required a quantitative study of the members of different unions. We describe how each of the four 
stakeholder groups is perceived by the unions and the forms of cooperation developed. 
"Confrontation with other stakeholders will help us evolve our positioning." (CFDT, 2013) 
 
Impact of the Central Government on Unions’ CSR Strategies 
In recent years, the French government has developed two kinds of CSR promotion initiatives that 
clearly influence unions’ CSR strategies. One is legislative, the other is procedural.  
(1) Since 2001, companies listed on the French stock market must integrate a list of social and 
environmental indicators in their annual report to shareholders, which is largely available to internal 
stakeholders and the general public (Delbard, 2008). In 2012, the French government decided to 
progressively extend this obligation to companies that are not listed on the stock market, but have a 
minimum of 500 employees. This legislation encourages managers to think about companies’ social 
and environmental impacts and to develop performance indicators to measure progress in these 
areas. This reporting requirement guarantees the French trade unions and workers’ representatives 
extensive information about companies’ CSR strategies, practices and performances, thus enabling 
Stakeholders’ Influence on French Unions’ CSR Strategies 16 
unions to control companies and develop CSR activities. 
"The best tool to launch societal dialogue or dialogue with union teams on subjects other than the 
perimeter of the classic social dialogue is certainly regular reporting, which accounts for the social 
and environmental objectives the business has set (…) CGT, CFDT, are quite convinced of the value 
of this." (CFDT, 2012) 
"The question of the particular decree on transparency of business operations is an element that we 
view as also one of mobilization because as soon as there are things that are in the law and that 
there are obligations for businesses, it’s easier for us to give our militants the necessary information 
so that they can be actors in the company." (CGT, 2012) 
(2) Since 2007, the French government has organized various stakeholder consultations on CSR. 
The landmark national consultation process called “Grenelle de l’Environnement” brought together 
representatives from the national and the regional governments, and from businesses, unions and 
NGOs to jointly analyze the major environmental challenges and to define future policies in this 
area (Stanziola Vieira & Bétaille, 2008). Over a period of three months in 2007, these stakeholders 
met in six working groups on subjects such as climate change, biodiversity, sustainable production 
and consumption, green jobs and competitiveness. Each working group was composed of 40 
members, i.e., 8 for each stakeholder group. Their task was to propose measures in favor of 
sustainable development and to identify obstacles to their implementation. Despite much criticism 
about insufficient translation of the conclusions from this consultation process into legally binding 
regulations, there is a broad consensus among experts on the positive impact of this stakeholder 
dialogue on the level of awareness of environmental challenges among all involved actors, and on 
the potential for innovation in this field (Whiteside et al., 2010). This consensus is shared by the 
respondents in our interviews:  
"The event led us to clarify our proposals, work on its content etc. including working on others' 
proposals, so it was a time of accelerating our reflection and related practice." (CGT, 2012) 
"The fact that governance is at 5 has completely changed the culture of the debate very quickly, and 
for one of the rare times, the common good prevailed over categorical claims. (…) We did not reach 
a consensus but fabricated reality collectively. And from this viewpoint it was very interesting." 
(CFTC, 2012b) 
"Le Grenelle was a catalyst because we had to take a stand, so it let us, in a sense, demonstrate that 
this theme was one on which unions should take a position and not just say ‘okay, it's good.’" (CFE-
CGC, 2012b) 
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"The Grenelle de l'Environnement represents an advance because a few commitments were made. 
Very difficult to implement after that because the realization process is very complicated." (CGT, 
2013) 
Similar consultation processes were organized in recent years on a smaller scale, leading in 2013 to 
the creation of a multi-stakeholder CSR platform at the prime-ministerial level. These consultations 
have encouraged cooperation between central government, unions and the other stakeholders, in 
particular companies and NGOs.  
"Le Grenelle was undoubtedly a real federating event, particularly on links and relations that we 
have with a whole series of associations, it’s a federating force, that's very very clear." (CGT, 2012) 
"It notably let unions and NGOs see their areas of convergence and divergence, a bit according to 
their positioning." (CFE-CGC, 2012b) 
They are raising the level of awareness of CSR among the unions and pushing unions to allocate 
human resources to these consultation bodies and to defend their positions in discussions with other 
stakeholders. 
"At the time of Grenelle, there weren’t enough hands and brains, so we attracted people, who after 
being involved kept defending these interests.” (CFDT, 2012) 
All five unions recognize the power of the central government and its legitimacy to develop 
activities in the field of CSR and expect the government to do more to encourage and guarantee 
responsible business practices. At first glance, there seems to be no connection between unions’ 
perception of the central government and their CSR strategy. However, in-depth analysis of the 
interviews shows that CGT-FO, the union with a reactive and presently defensive CSR strategy, 
highlights the legitimacy of the central government to address social and environmental challenges 
more than the other unions do. This union thinks the government should be the only actor to deal 
with these issues via its legislation, while the other unions consider the government as one actor 
among others and acknowledge their responsibility for promoting CSR principles.  
"We have a fairly strong concept of the social republic. Maybe a little too legalistic, I really don’t 
know, but anyway it suits us fine that there is a legal framework that guarantees equal treatment 
over the whole territory, it’s not the company head who decides alone in a corner, who will start 
negotiations on a given subject, the law requires him to do this, so he has to do it whether he wants 
to or not" (CGT-FO, 2012a). 
CFTC and CFE-CGC, the two unions that adopted the accommodative CSR strategy, recognized 
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the importance of participating in the consultation processes organized by the government, but 
sometimes found it difficult to find human resources to participate in these consultations. They 
explain that the number of meetings and working groups set up by the central government has 
strained their limited resources.  
"For us it was a real problem during Grenelle (…) It was a monstrous task of solicitation, I don’t 
know how many meetings, anyway we couldn't follow everything anymore, so we appealed to the 
people to choose" (CFE-CGC, 2012b) 
CFTC and CFE-CGC admit that if they attend these consultation processes, it is because of the 
power of the central government and their willingness to try to influence decisions that will have a 
major impact on companies, along with their fear of being excluded from future consultations on 
CSR or other subjects. In contrast CFDT and CGT clearly welcome these consultations and actively 
take part in them.  
 
The differences among the five unions appear more clearly in their degree of cooperation with 
central government in the field of CSR. CFDT, the union with the most proactive CSR strategy, 
clearly affirms its commitment to the CSR consultation processes organized by the government. 
CFDT highlights its efforts to prepare for meetings in order to make the debate more efficient and 
encourage the adoption of effective decisions. This is also true for CGT, the other union that favors 
a proactive CSR strategy. Both unions also use common think tanks with NGOs to prepare for the 
consultation processes organized by the central government and to support the government’s 
commitment to CSR, for example regarding the extension of the legislation on mandatory CSR 
reporting to companies that are not listed on the stock market. In 2012 and 2013, CFTC and CFE-
CGC, the two unions pursuing an accommodative strategy, tried to promote specific projects related 
to CSR that could differentiate them from the government’s perspective. CFTC developed the 
concept of “social footprint,” aimed at showing the consumer the social and environmental impacts 
of products throughout the whole supply chain. CFE-CGC asked the government to start 
negotiations to put CSR on the work council’s agenda. 
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"For two years, through public powers, we have demanded negotiations to put sustainable 
development and hence its social component CSR at the heart of social dialogue with bodies 
that represent the personnel." (CFE-CGC, 2013). 
These two unions perceive central government as an actor that can support their projects in the field 
of CSR. 
 
Impact of NGOs on Unions’ CSR Strategies 
While most NGOs concentrate on their own activities or try to lobby the government, an increasing 
number of NGOs aim to influence the behavior of companies and thus promote the principles of 
CSR (Doh & Guay, 2006; Burchell & Cook, 2013). The perception of NGOs and of the potential to 
cooperate with NGOs varies widely among the five major French unions. 
 
In our interviews, representatives from all five unions implicitly or explicitly recognized the power 
of NGOs and consider them a potential threat to unions. Often, NGOs are more effective than 
unions at engaging the media and attracting the young generation to join them. Indeed, NGOs are 
given the most weight in the consultation processes organized by the government. NGOs may thus 
be viewed as competitors of unions.  
"In sustainable development, NGOs are rising in power, so we can’t just pretend that they don't 
exist" (CFE-CGC, 2013) 
There seems to be no specific link between the fact that the unions recognize the power of NGOs 
and their CSR strategy. On the contrary, there is a clear link between the perceived legitimacy of 
NGOs and unions’ CSR strategy. CFDT and CGT, unions with a proactive CSR strategy, but also 
CFTC and CFE-CGC, explicitly recognize the legitimacy of the most significant NGOs and their 
expertise, not only in environmental areas but also in social domains that go beyond employment 
and working conditions. These unions are ready to ask relevant NGOs to denounce companies’ 
irresponsible practices. 
"There are a number of reliable NGOs, social-Christian networks are fairly well installed, but 
beyond all the possible and reliable networks" (CFTC, 2012a)  
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Conversely, CGT-FO, which developed a reactive followed by a defensive CSR strategy, openly 
questions the legitimacy of NGOs. CGT-FO union denies NGOs’ expertise and legitimacy on social 
issues. For this union, NGO leaders often only represent themselves, while unions communicate on 
behalf of their membership and appoint their leaders and define their strategies according to a 
transparent process. These major differences justify, according to CGT-FO, excluding NGOs from 
the traditional bilateral social dialogue between employers and unions.  
"Often, the NGOs represent only themselves (…) and go about expressing themselves on the so-
called social pillar (…) it causes great damage because you have associations that allow themselves 
to express their ideas in fields that are clearly not their own. Not to mention that we can ask the 
question that the unions have asked us since 2008, that of the representativeness of these   
associations" (CGT-FO, 2012a) 
These differences among the five unions also appear when it comes to cooperation with NGOs. 
CGT-FO refuses to cooperate with NGOs, believing that they have different priorities. 
 
Conversely, CFDT and CGT, which favor proactive CSR strategies, have developed close 
cooperation with NGO's on environmental issues for several years. CFDT has established a 
partnership with the environmental NGO France Nature Environment (FNE). CFDT maintains that 
this NGO has a reformist approach similar to its own. Both organizations consider that it is useful to 
make compromises and prefer to sign agreements allowing them to achieve most of their aims 
rather than expect the other party to accept all their priorities. Moreover, FNE has a huge number of 
members, which distinguishes it from other NGOs that are mainly supported by donors. For the 
moment, the partnership mainly concerns the national cross-industry level, but some projects have 
also emerged at the sector or the regional level. CGT does not want to conclude a partnership with a 
specific NGO. It prefers to discuss with all NGOs and to launch concrete projects with those that 
are interested.  
"With NGOs, yes, the fact of having concrete actions with them effectively changes and anchors a 
things with NGOs a little bit more than before." (CGT, 2013) 
Most of these contacts emerge in the Citizens’ Forum on CSR, which CGT and CFDT created with 
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several French NGOs in 2004. 
"We discuss timely topics, we try to understand each other, to bring our points of view closer 
together, even to take a common position, or write things in common, that's essentially at the 
national level." (CFDT, 2012) 
"We work in the Citizens’ Forum and in other places to try to clarify our concepts."(CGT, 2012) 
Similarly, CFTC cooperates with several NGOs, particularly on projects in emerging countries. To 
monitor compliance with social norms within global supply chains, CFTC cooperates with NGOs 
that operate internationally.  
"We have found a favorable echo in the Secours Catholique and its international arm Caritas, of 
course, which is actually a very very very big sounding board on the global scene" (CFTC, 2012a) 
These three unions underline the common culture between unions and NGOs and the fact that many 
of their members are also involved in NGOs. They consider cooperation with NGOs as a way to 
access expertise, particularly on environmental issues, and sometimes as an opportunity to renew 
their image or even to recruit new members.  
 
CFE-CGC, the other union with an accommodative CSR strategy, had started to developed 
partnerships with NGOs at the beginning of 2000s, but did not continue until 2012, because they 
perceived  NGOs as primarily interested in environmental protection. Now, however, CFE-CGC is 
willing to dialogue with NGOs in public forums and to consult them when producing a guide on 
sustainable development. 
"We have established partnerships with Amnesty International, with the Guilde Européenne 
du Raid in the early 2000s, but maybe we didn't cultivate them enough   (…) we intend to 
reactivate them with nongovernmental organizations, particularly environmental ones" 
(CFE-CGC, 2013). 
There is thus a clear link among unions’ perception of NGOs, the kind of cooperation they develop, 
if any, and unions’ CSR strategies. Unions that adopt a proactive CSR strategy perceive NGOs 
positively and have developed longstanding close cooperation with them, while the union that 
adopted a reactive and presently a defensive CSR strategy has a critical approach to NGOs and 
refuses to cooperate with them. However, the link is less evident for the two unions that favor an 
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accommodative approach: they developed later or less cooperation with NGOs.  
 
Impact of Individual Companies on Unions’ CSR Strategies 
The commitment of individual companies to CSR principles evidently varies considerably. 
According to Clarkson’s scale (1995), which we have adapted for unions, companies’ CSR 
strategies may be reactive, defensive, accommodative or proactive. Companies that adopt reactive 
or defensive CSR strategies may have an indirect impact on unions’ strategies, pushing them either 
to distrust the CSR concept or to adopt a reactive strategy. By contrast, more proactive unions may 
push companies to change their strategies and practices. We focus mainly on unions’ perceptions of 
and relations with companies adopting proactive CSR strategies, in particular those that decide to 
negotiate collective agreements on CSR. 
 
CGT-FO, which adopted a reactive and later a defensive CSR strategy, has a very negative 
perception of companies’ CSR activities. This union argues that the CSR concept is used to weaken 
the role of unions, because it replaces the traditional bilateral dialogue between employers and 
workers’ representatives by a multi-stakeholder dialogue where unions are one among many actors. 
Further, investment in improving the environmental performance of companies is seen as not 
leading to wage increases or better conditions for workers.  
"When you see an ad for Total [the oil and gas multinational company] it's so nice, no one’s more 
environment friendly than Total, on TV it can really make you cry, it’s so magnificent. So obviously 
in the marketing plan at the Total head office, yes there are beautiful sheets of glossy recycled, 
recyclable paper. Yet when you go visit a Total refinery, in France, the working conditions and 
standards for employees tell a very different story!" (CGT-FO, 2012a) 
The four other French unions that adopt proactive or accommodative CSR strategies perceive 
companies and their CSR activities more positively. This perception is based on the idea that is 
possible to create management practices that allow companies to reinforce their economic, social 
and environmental performance simultaneously. Unlike CGT, CFTC and CFDT accept that CSR 
can contribute to business competitiveness.  
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After understanding these perceptions, it is important to analyze the cooperation between unions 
and individual companies. Our study shows that CSR has become a subject for social dialogue 
between French unions and employers. Since the end of the 1990s, some French companies have 
started to negotiate transnational company agreements on CSR with workers’ representatives 
(Schoemann et al., 2008). These agreements cover only a small number of multinational companies 
concentrated in certain sectors, while most workers’ representatives have largely ignored the CSR 
concept and its potential impact on union activities (Sobczak & Havard, 2008). During our 
interviews, each of the five unions reported that they participated in the negotiation of agreements 
on CSR with companies, at the transnational, national or site level. In general, these negotiations are 
conducted locally without any intervention from the national unions, which are often unaware of all 
the initiatives.  
"We have testimonials from teams that are engaged in questions of CSR because they have 
negotiations planned" (CGT, 2013). 
This explains why even CGT-FO representatives take part in such negotiations and sign 
agreements, although the union moved from a reactive to a defensive CSR strategy. All unions are 
also involved in CSR negotiations at the sector level, particularly in the chemical, energy and car 
industries. 
"It’s at the federation level that CSR agreements are followed up, not the national level" (CFTC, 
2012a). 
In addition to negotiating such agreements, some French unions have developed common CSR 
initiatives with individual companies. One example is the CSR think tank ORSE (Observatoire sur 
la Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises [Observator for Corporate Social Responsibility]), 
which several companies and NGOs as well as three unions created in 2000. Surprisingly, CFE-
CGC, a union with an accommodative CSR strategy, was one of the first actors to promote the 
creation of this think tank. CFDT and CGT, the two unions with a proactive CSR strategy, joined 
the project immediately. The aims of this think tank are to create a network of stakeholders 
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committed to CSR, to favor exchange of information among them, and to collect, analyze and 
disseminate information on CSR. The unions’ participation in this think tank allowed them to 
develop their awareness and their expertise in CSR and to meet individual companies in a context 
other than that of social dialogue. CFTC and CGT-FO decided not to join the think tank, but instead 
have closely monitored its studies and often agree to be interviewed for its studies. 
 
Again, there is a clear link between unions’ CSR strategies, their perceptions of individual 
companies, and the forms of cooperation they establish with them. Unions with proactive CSR 
strategies have a better perception of companies’ legitimacy and have established various relations 
with companies ranging from collective bargaining to the creation of common think tanks. 
However, even unions with accommodative, defensive or reactive CSR strategies are willing to deal 
with individual companies. As partners of social dialogue, they necessarily interact with companies, 
particularly at the sector and site levels. Nevertheless, at least for the union that adopted a reactive 
followed by a defensive CSR strategy, these relations are far less developed. 
 
Impact of Other Unions on Unions’ CSR Strategies 
In the period covered by our study, unions’ CSR strategies have changed little, but are affirmed 
with increasing clarity. Our interviews show that union representatives are aware of the other 
unions’ CSR strategies. CSR-related consultation processes organized by the central government 
bring unions together and enable them to hear or read their counterparts’ positions. Unions also 
meet in the process of negotiating collective agreements on CSR at the sector or site level, where 
they learn the priorities of the other unions. Until now, knowledge of the strategies of the other 
unions has not led the five major unions to adopt a uniform CSR strategy or even to bring their 
points of view closer together.  
"Each one conveys something in CSR, we do not all say the same thing, if you will. We converge on 
points because we all seek to have the most clout vis-à-vis businesses on a number of issues, 
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particularly questions of employment and the environment. But at the same time each is defending 
their own issues." (CGT, 2013) 
On the contrary, the adoption of proactive CSR strategies by CFDT and CGT has lead CGT-FO to 
entrench its reactive and presently defensive position, and CGT-FO’s reactive or defensive position 
has confirmed CFDT and CGT in their proactive strategy.  
"That's what differentiates us mostly, I think, from the CGT and the CFDT. We do not claim 
to be co-managers are co-executives, we are a union organization, we know how to stay at 
our level of responsibility" (CGT-FO, 2012a).  
CFTC and CFE-CGC, the two smallest unions, both of which adopted an accommodative strategy, 
clearly perceive the power of the bigger unions that have more substantial resources to develop their 
CSR proactive strategy. The accommodative strategy these small unions pursue can also be partly 
explained by the context of increased competition that they faced. When the French legislator 
changed the rules for union representativeness, based on the results of workplace elections, these 
two unions feared for their survival. To distinguish themselves from the other unions, the smaller 
unions developed the idea of “social footprint” (CFTC) and created the sustainable development 
charter (CFE-CGC) to be more marketable to government, employees or other unions.  
"We have successfully demonstrated that if we did not position ourselves, first, our competitors 
would, and forged alliances, because for example the CFDT formed an alliance with an NGO, there 
was an agreement, etc. We said, hey, watch it." (CFE-CGC, 2012b)  
"We at the CFTC have been too accustomed to having ideas that were not bad, which were even 
good, I think, we discussed them with others, and we saw them [stolen outright] by other 
organizations. It’s quite annoying." (CFTC, 2012a) 
Our interviews show that the French unions that adopt reactive or defensive CSR strategies, and to a 
lesser extent those that adopt accommodative CSR strategies, have established various forms of 
cooperation with one another. In 2002, four French unions, i.e. CFDT, CFE-CGC, CFTC and CGT, 
created a committee on employees’ savings to develop a label for socially responsible funds and to 
encourage union members at the company level to invest in these funds. In 2005, CFDT, CFTC and 
CGT signed the “Union Charter for Equal Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Diversity”. These 
federative actions illustrate the cooperative attitude French trade unions can develop in the field of 
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CSR. Further, in 2004, CFDT and CGT joined several NGOs and academics to launch the 
“Citizens’ Forum on CSR,” whose aim is to develop common positions and to jointly defend them 
in discussions with companies or policy makers.  
"The main crucible for exchange for us is the Citizens’ Forum. It's a fairly important 
crucible because we sometimes have exchanges that include debates, there may be a few 
nuances, even a few divergences sometimes that arise. It's there where we actually delve 
into a number of subjects" (CGT, 2013). 
Finally, CFE-CGC, CFDT and CGT, together with individual companies and NGOs, have created 
the CSR think tank ORSE. Among the major French unions, only CGT-FO declined to take part in 
these initiatives. 
 
There is thus a link between unions’ CSR strategies and the kind of cooperation they establish with 
other unions. French unions adopting proactive CSR strategies, and to a lesser extent those with 
accommodative CSR strategies, develop various forms of cooperation with other unions. The union 
with a reactive and presently defensive CSR strategy barely cooperates with other unions regarding 
CSR. This lack of cooperation may be linked not only to a lack of interest, but also to the fact that 
the other major unions do not share that union’s CSR strategy. 
* 
*     * 
To summarize, Table 5 provides an overview over the CSR strategy, stakeholders’ perceptions and 
cooperation with stakeholders for the five major unions. This table shows clear connections 
between these three elements for unions with a proactive, defensive or reactive CSR strategy. For 
the unions with an accommodative CSR strategy, the links may seem less evident, which can 
explain the weak status of this strategy.  
 
Table 5: Unions’ CSR strategy, their perception of and their cooperation with stakeholders 
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Union CSR strategy Perceptions of and cooperation with stakeholders 
Central 
Government 
NGOs Companies Other unions 
CFDT proactive perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
CGT proactive perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
CFTC accommodative perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; 
cooperation if 
necessary 
perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; some 
close 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; some 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; some 
cooperation 
CFE-CGC accommodative perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; 
cooperation if 
necessary 
perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; some 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; some 
cooperation 
perceived as 
legitimate; close 
cooperation 
CGT-FO reactive and 
defensive 
perceived as 
powerful and 
legitimate; 
cooperation if 
necessary 
perceived as 
powerful but not 
legitimate; no 
cooperation  
perceived as 
illegitimate; 
local 
cooperation 
without national 
approval  
perceived as 
legitimate; no 
cooperation 
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The links are the most evident between unions’ CSR strategies and their perceptions of NGOs, and 
between unions’ strategies and their cooperation with NGOs. Unions that adopt proactive CSR 
strategies (CFDT and CGT) perceive NGOs as potential partners rather than potential threats, while 
the union that adopts a reactive and presently defensive CSR strategy (CGT-FO) perceives NGOs as 
competitors or even as threats. Unions that adopt an accommodative CSR strategy (CFTC and CFE-
CGC) have more complex perceptions of NGOs. Both unions have cooperated with NGOs, 
sometimes rather closely, but their limited resources presently do not allow them to develop more 
ambitious activities. 
 
The link among unions’ CSR strategies and the way they perceive the central government or other 
unions and their cooperation with these actors is less evident, but not lacking completely. The union 
that adopts the most proactive CSR strategy (CFDT) cooperates the most with central government 
and with other unions. CFDT considers it crucial to help the government promote CSR and to 
develop related activities. The union is thus particularly involved in the working groups set up by 
the central government and dedicates huge resources to supporting these initiatives. Similarly, 
CFDT insists on the importance of acting in partnership with CGT in the area of CSR to avoid 
being perceived by its members and other employees as the only union that endorses voluntary 
initiatives. CFDT is thus willing to share some of its expertise in the field of CSR to favor its 
broader acceptance. However, it would be difficult to conclude that the unions that are less involved 
in CSR are necessarily less open to partnerships with central government or other unions. On the 
contrary, CGT-FO, the union adopting a reactive CSR strategy, limits its cooperation with the 
government and other unions to the strict minimum. 
 
The links between unions’ CSR strategies, their perceptions of individual companies and their 
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cooperation with companies are much less visible. Indeed, all unions cooperate with companies in 
some way, and take part in collective bargaining on CSR. This apparent contradiction for the union 
that adopted a reactive followed by a defensive CSR strategy may be explained by the fact that this 
cooperation takes place at a decentralized level without the involvement or even the information of 
the national union. This element highlights the need to develop further research on how union 
members at the sector and company levels are involved in the development and implementation of 
unions’ CSR strategies and how they perceive these strategies. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article explored the influence of stakeholders on French unions’ CSR strategies, which range 
from reactive to proactive. It extended stakeholder theory, which is generally applied to companies, 
and adapted it to the analysis of unions as focal organizations of stakeholder relationships. Using a 
qualitative and longitudinal methodology, we analyzed the links between unions’ CSR strategy, and 
the perception of other stakeholders, and their willingness to cooperate with such stakeholders on 
CSR.  
 
While our research clearly confirms the existence of these links for the main stakeholders, it is more 
difficult to understand whether the perceptions of and cooperation with the stakeholders influence 
unions’ CSR strategy, or whether it is the CSR strategy that influences unions’ perception of and 
cooperation with stakeholders. An argument in favor of the second option is that unions’ CSR 
strategies have changed little in recent years, unlike interactions with stakeholders. Our theoretical 
framework suggests that there are probably reciprocal influences between unions’ CSR strategy, 
their perceptions of stakeholders and the kind of cooperation developed with them. Future research 
is needed to clarify the precise nature of these links and the nature of stakeholder dialogue 
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(O’Riordan & Fairbrass, 2008).  
 
A next step in the research agenda would entail investigating the impact of union members and of 
employers’ associations on unions’ CSR strategies. Further research should take a network 
perspective in order to move beyond the bilateral relationships between unions and each of their 
stakeholders. Finally, this analysis of the impact of stakeholders on French unions’ CSR strategies 
is highly embedded in the national context, both related to CSR (Berthoin Antal & Sobczak, 2004) 
and to industrial relations (Preuss et al., 2014). It would therefore be important to conduct similar 
studies in other countries to test the validity of the findings in other national contexts. 
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